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Abstract 
 
This paper opens up for scrutiny the politics of algorithmic surveillance through an examination of Facial 
Recognition Systems (FRS’s) in video surveillance, showing that seemingly mundane design decisions may 
have important political consequences that ought to be subject to scrutiny. It first focuses on the politics of 
technology and algorithmic surveillance systems in particular: considering t he broad politics of technology; 
the nature of algorithmic surveillance and biometrics, claiming that software algorithms are a particularly 
important domain of techno-politics; and finally considering both the growth of algorithmic biometric 
surveillance and the potential problems with such systems. Secondly, it gives an account of FRS’s, the 
algorithms  upon which they are based, and the biases embedded therein. In the third part, the ways in which 
these biases may manifest itself in real world implementation of FRS’s are outlined. Finally, some policy 
suggestions for the future development of FRS’s are made; it is noted that the most common critiques of 
such systems are based on notions of privacy which seem increasingly at odds with the world of automated 
systems.  
 
 
 
 
Introduction: the circulation of faces 
 
In a post 9/11 world security has become a big question for those feeling vulnerable. As in so 
many instances in social history the answer to this vulnerability is sought in a sort of certainty 
rooted in surveillance (Lyon, 1994, 2001, 2002; Dandeker, 1990).  It is argued that through 
surveillance and early detection the problem can be solved. Security can be secured.  
 
Surveillance is a powerful technology for social control, however, when surveillance becomes 
digitised then a there is a “step change in power, intensity and scope” (Graham and Wood, 
2003).  Digitisation permits the use of software algorithms (mathematical instructions –see 
Section 2) for automated identification of human biometrics (a bodily trace - see Section 2) 
With a biometric it is very difficult, if not impossible, for any individual to disassociate oneself (or 
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be alienated) from one’s  biometric – in a sense you are your biometric (Van der Ploeg, 2002). 
Thus, if there is a match between your body and your biometric certainty over identity can be 
established.  However effective surveillance also needs to be subtle, to be insinuated into the 
context of everyday life. Indeed in the security world the perfect unobtrusive biometric is 
considered the ‘holy grail’.  It is therefore not surprising that facial recognition system (FRS) 
have become a prime focus for the security establishment (Kopel & Krause, 2003). Not only 
are they relatively inexpensive, and supposedly effective, they require no involvement from their 
targets. Unlike other biometrics facial recognition can operate anonymously in the background. 
The targets do not need to surrender their face image, as they would their fingerprint, or their iris 
scan. A face can be captured and (de)coded without the consent or participation from those 
being targeted. 
 
However, this ‘captured’ face image is only of use if it  can be matched with an identifier. It 
requires a database of face images with associated identities.  Unlike fingerprints or DNA 
samples, which are only collected when there is a reasonable level of suspicion of a crime, face 
images are routinely collected in society by a variety of institutions, such as when we apply for a 
driving licence, or a passport, or a library card, etc.  It is the most common biometric in use by 
humans to identify other humans. Indeed, in any western society, if one would somehow cover, 
or be seen to attempt to disguise one’s face, then there is almost an immediate assumption of 
guilt. One could almost say that there is an implicit common agreement to reveal our faces to 
others as a condition for ongoing social order. Thus, we tend to reveal our face to others and 
they to us.  However, it seems that such an agreement only operates in a local and situated 
manner, as part of the social relationships we control. We would find it unacceptable if a 
stranger would photograph our face for no apparent reason. On the other hand we don’t find it 
unacceptable to surrender our faces for the regulation of privileges—as long as we are in control 
of its use and circulation. In most cases it is used in the moment of authentication (by means of 
visual comparison) and then forgotten.  However, what happens if our faces are collected 
anonymously, encoded, and start to circulate in an invisible network, even if it is for seemingly 
mundane reasons? When our face “becomes a bar code”, in the words of Agre (2003).  This 
seems not what we have in mind when we reveal our faces? It seems to us that the presence of 
FRS’s may indeed be changing the implied relationships we assume when facing others. This 
concern becomes even more acute if we start to ‘unpack’ these algorithms to discover that to 
the algorithms ‘all faces are not equal’. It is our contention that FRS’s is a very powerful and 
ambiguous technology for social control. As such it requires much more scrutiny than it has had 
up to now.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to open up for scrutiny the politics of facial recognition technology 
and its use in ‘smart’ CCTV. We aim to show that seemingly mundane design decisions may 
have important political consequences that ought to be subject to scrutiny.  
 
This paper is one step in that direction.  It is structured as follows: the first section will focus on 
the politics of technology and algorithmic surveillance systems in particular, considering first the 
broad politics of technology, then explaining the nature of algorithmic surveillance and 
biometrics, claiming that software algorithms are a particularly important domain of techno-
politics; and finally considering both the growth of algorithmic biometric surveillance and the 
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potential problems with such systems. In the second section, we will give an account of FRS’s, 
the algorithms they are based upon, and the biases embedded therein. In the third part, we will 
discuss the ways in which these biases may manifest itself in real world implementation of 
FRS’s. Finally, we will make some policy suggestion for the future development of FRS’s; it 
should be noted that the most common critiques of such systems are based on notions of 
privacy which seem increasingly at odds with the world of automated systems.  
 
 
1. The Politics of Technology 
 
The Micro-Politics of the Artefact  
Technology is political (Winner, 1980). By this we mean that technology, by its very design, 
includes certain interests and excludes others. It is mostly an implicit politics, part of a mundane 
process of trying to solve practical problems. For example the ATM bank machine assumes a 
particular person in front of it. It assumes a person that is able to see the screen, read it, 
remember and enter a PIN code, etc.  It is not difficult to imagine a whole section of society that 
does not conform with this assumption. If you are blind, in a wheelchair, have problem 
remembering, or unable to enter a PIN, because of disability, then your interest in accessing 
your account can be excluded by the ATM design.  This exclusion of interests may not be 
obvious to the designers of ATMs as they may see their task as trying simply to solve a basic 
problem of making banking transactions more efficient for the ‘average’ customer doing average 
transactions. And they are mostly right — but if they are not, then their biases can become 
profoundly stubborn. These systems often seem like devices for surveillance and social control 
(in the sense of Foucault’s dispositif panoptique), but as Lianos (2001, 2003) has recently 
pointed out, they are not designed with the monitoring and control of the human subject directly 
in mind, rather this is a potential (or secondary) function of systems for ensuring flow. 
Nevertheless the binary effects are in some senses quite irreversible. Where does the excluded 
go to appeal when they are faced with a stubborn and mute object such as an ATM?  Maybe 
they can work around it, by going into the branch for example. This may be possible. However, 
this exclusion becomes all the more significant because of the political economic context in which 
these dispositifs exists and which they help to transform, for example if banks start to close 
branches or charge for an over-the-counter transaction (as is happening). Thus, as the micro-
politics of the ATM becomes tied to, and multiplied through other exclusionary practices,  what 
seems to be a rather trivial injustice soon may multiply into what may seem to be as an coherent 
and intentional strategy of exclusion (Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000). Yet there is often nobody 
there that ‘authored’ it as such (Foucault, 1975; Kafka, 1925). This paper will show how such 
an ‘unauthored’ strategy may be emerging in facial recognition technology.  
 
Thus, the politics of technology is more than the politics of this or that artefact. Rather these 
artefacts function as nodes, or links, in a dynamic socio-technical network, or collective, kept in 
place by a multiplicity of artefacts, agreements, alliances, conventions, translations, procedures, 
threats, and so forth: in short by relationships of power and discipline (Callon 1986, 1991). 
Some are stable, even irreversible; some are dynamic and fragile.  Analytically we can isolate 
and describe these networks (see Law 1991, for examples). However, as we survey the 
landscape of networks we cannot locate, in any obvious manner, where they begin nor where 
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they end. Indeed we cannot with any degree of certainty separate the purely social from the 
purely technical, cause from effect, designer from user, winners from losers, and so on.  
 
In these complex and dynamic socio-technical networks ATMs, doors, locks, keys, cameras, 
algorithms, etc. — function as political ‘locations’ where values and interests are negotiated and 
ultimately ‘inscribed’ into the very materiality of the things themselves—thereby rendering these 
values and interests more or less permanent (Akrich, 1992; Latour, 1991).  Through these 
inscriptions, which may be more or less successful, those that encounter and use these inscribed 
artefacts become, wittingly or unwittingly, enrolled into particular programmes, or scripts for 
action. Neither the artefacts nor those that draw upon them simply except these inscriptions and 
enrolments as inevitable or unavoidable. In the flow of everyday life artefacts often get lost, 
break down, and need to be maintained. Furthermore, those that draw upon them use them in 
unintended ways, ignoring or deliberately ‘misreading’ the script the objects may endeavour to 
impose. Nevertheless, to the degree that these enrolments are successful, the consequences of 
such enrolments can result in more or less profound political ‘ideologies’ that ought to be 
scrutinised.  We would claim that the politics of artefacts is much more mundane and much more 
powerful than most other politics, yet it often evades our scrutiny. It is with this in mind that we 
can introduce the politics of algorithmic surveillance 
 
 
2. Algorithmic surveillance 
  
What is an Algorithm? 
The word ‘algorithm’ derives from the hugely influential 9th Century Muslim mathematician, 
Muhammed ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi, who produced the first extant text on algebra - a term 
which also originates with him. 12th Century Christian scholars used al-Khwarizmi’s name, 
latinized as ‘algorismus’ to differentiate his method of calculation from commonly used methods 
like the abacus or counting tables3.  
 
An algorithm is simply a mathematical, or logical, term for a set of instructions. Algorithms can 
be divided into trivial and non-trivial types, the former being sets of instructions that are only 
applicable to a specific situation, or a task that needs to further explanation, the latter being 
instructions that will provide answers given any compatible input. Texts on algorithmics often 
give the example of a recipe as a useful metaphor for understanding the concept, though in fact 
this is slightly inaccurate: the recipe is more like software (see below).  
 
Algorithms form the basis of modern mathematics and most importantly here, the foundation of 
computing. However in themselves algorithms are not accessible to computers, they need to be 
translated into a form that computers have been programmed to understand. This process, 
known as coding (or hacking) produces software. Software is essentially composed of many 
coded algorithms linked together to produce a desired output from the hardware.  In the 
metaphor mentioned above, the software is therefore the recipe. Computer hardware is not in 
itself usually algorithmic, rather it is composed of many physical switches (however small) which 
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have two positions, on/off, 1/0 etc. These switches then respond to instructions from the 
software, once it has been translated (assembled) into binary machine code4.  
 
Algorithmic Surveillance  
The term ‘algorithmic surveillance’ was coined by Norris and Armstrong (1999) in their 
pioneering book, The Maximum Surveillance Society. It is in literal terms surveillance that 
makes use of automatic step-by-step instructions. However it is used specifically to refer to 
surveillance technologies that make use of computer systems to provide more than the raw data 
observed. This can range from systems that classify and store simple data, through more 
complex systems that compare the captured data to other data and provide matches, to systems 
that attempt to predict events based on the captured data.  
 
Thus many surveillance technologies currently in use have algorithmic aspects, but not all. A city-
centre CCTV system that provides images that are watched and analysed by guards or police is 
not algorithmic. If such a system contains a computer which compares the faces of people 
captured by the cameras which those of known offenders, then it is. If typists enter in the health 
details of a patient into the Health Service computer, then it is algorithmic to a limited extent in 
that software determines the extent of the information that can be entered, however it becomes 
what is usually understood as algorithmic surveillance when, for example, a program is installed 
which compares the patient records against signs of particular disease risk-factors, and defines 
or categorises patients automatically.  
 
Algorithmic Surveillance in Practice 
There are now many algorithmic surveillance systems which watch over almost all aspects of this 
planet and beyond (if one includes systems like the Hubble deep-space telescope and the 
Cassini project). Many of these systems monitor the non-human (water and electricity flow etc.) 
and are thus left largely unconsidered by social researchers; although there was a temporary 
wave of concern prior to the year 2000 with the fear of the so-called Millenium Bug that 
apparently had the potential to cause many of these systems to fail or malfunction. There are 
many algorithmic systems which have a hybrid monitoring function, for example the recordings 
of cash withdrawals from ATM machines, credit and debit card transactions and purchases in 
stores to which we refered above.  
 
There are also systems which algorithmically record data and sort about things, but things which 
are related to human beings for example, car number plate recognition. Again these systems do 
indirectly monitor people, but there is no necessary correlation between a particular human and 
a number plate although this is quite likely and in some cases legally restricted. Systems like 
movement recognition can be used both for nonhuman and inhuman things and human beings 
depending on the circumstances and details of the technology used. Examples of these again are 
often about flow management for example, the Prismatica/Cromatica movement-recognition 
developed for the London Underground to ensure the movement of passengers is efficient and 
safe. The original system as it turned out in operation had the unintended consequence of being 
able to detect potential suicides – as it was observed that they remained relatively motionless on 
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the platform for longer periods than most before jumping (Norris 2003) – but again this an 
indirect consequence of the behaviour of human beings observed through a system of flow 
management. These systems are extremely interesting because, whatever their intention, they do 
transform the context of social interaction in quite fundamental ways creating what Lianos and 
Douglas (2000) call Automated Socio-Technical Environments (ASTEs).  
 
Recent years have however seen the largely experimental introduction of automated systems for 
the direct monitoring of human beings based on physical traits unique to the individual. These 
‘biometric’ identification systems include: gait recognition; fingerprint and palmprint recognition; 
facial recognition; and iris recognition. Each has its own technical merits and drawbacks and 
each is suitable for different uses in varying physical environments. The oldest of these are hand-
geometry recognition systems5 which internally have remained largely unchanged since the 
1970s, and which still work very well in environments where access is restricted to a relatively 
small database of people.  
 
The Growth of Algorithmic S urveillance 
Before the attacks of September 11th 2001, the biometrics industry was expanding steadily but 
not spectacularly and was also facing increasing opposition from civil rights and privacy groups. 
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, particularly in the USA, there was a general 
assumption that rights arguments would lose out during what one of us has elsewhere 
characterised as a period of ‘surveillance surge’ (Wood, Konvitz and Ball 2003) wherein those 
with an interest in new surveillance technologies promote them to a polity shocked enough by 
events not to consider their efficiency, effectiveness or wider implications as carefully as they 
might normally do. 
 
Zureik (2004)6 shows that within a few weeks of the terrorist attacks almost 17 bills were 
introduced in the United States Congress, including measures “to tighten immigration, visa, and 
naturalization procedures, allow tax benefits to companies that use biometrics, and check 
employee background at border and maritime check points.” 
 
He concludes that: 
 
the combination of public fear, lobbying efforts of the industry, and linkages 
between political and economic interests, have catapulted the industry to centre 
stage in the fight against terrorism – an industry that until September 11 was a 
marginal player in the security field (ibid.) 
 
On the Silent Politics of the Software Algorithm 
Having argued that technology is political, and introduced algorithmic surveillance systems, we 
now want to claim that the politics of information technology (in the form of software algorithms) 
is, in a sense, of a different order (Graham and Wood, 2003). We want to contend that 
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Introna and Wood: Picturing Algorithmic Surveillance 
Surveillance & Society 2(2/3) 
 
183 
scrutinising information technology is particularly problematic since information technology, in 
particular algorithms, is what we would term a silent technology as opposed to a salient 
technology (Introna, 1998). Obviously we do not see this distinction as a dichotomy but rather 
as a continuum.  As an attempt to draw this distinction some aspects are highlighted in Table 1 
below.   
 
Table 1: Silent versus Salient Technology 
 
Facial recognition algorithms in ‘smart’ CCTV is a particularly good example of a silent 
technology. The facial recognition capability can be imbedded into existing CCTV networks, 
making its operation impossible to detect. Furthermore, it is entirely passive in its operation. It 
requires no participation or consent from its targets—it is “non-intrusive, contact-free process” 
(Woodward et al., 2003: 7).  Its application is flexible. It can as easily be used by a 
supermarket to monitor potential shoplifters (as was proposed and later abandoned, by the 
Borders bookstore), by casinos to track potential fraudsters, by law enforcement to monitor 
spectators at a Super Bowl match (as was done in Tampa, Florida), or used for identifying 
‘terrorists’ at airports (as is currently in operation at various US airports).  However, most 
important is the obscurity of its operation.  
 
This obscurity is due to two factors. First, most of the software algorithms at the heart of facial 
recognition systems are propriety software objects. Thus, it is very difficult to get access to them 
for inspection and scrutiny. More specifically, even if you can go through the code line by line, it 
is impossible to inspect that code in operation, as it becomes implemented through multiple 
layers of translation for its execution. At the most basic level we have electric currents flowing 
through silicon chips, at the highest level we have programme instructions, yet it is almost 
impossible to trace the connection between these as it is being executed.  Thus, it is virtually 
impossible to know if the code you inspected is the code being executed, when executed. In 
short, software algorithms are operationally obscure.  Second, most of the algorithms in facial 
recognition are based on very sophisticated statistical methods that only a handful of experts can 
interpret and understand. Indeed it seems that even they have been surprised by the behaviour 
of their algorithms (Philips et al., 2003). Thus, for most ordinary members of society facial 
recognition systems are somewhat exotic and obscure ‘black boxes’. After all they do well what 
we find difficult to do — identify faces. This obscurity together with their obvious sophistication 
may give them a legitimacy beyond that which they deserve. In moments of uncertainty they may 
be taken as more authoritative than the humans involved — this could have important 
implications as we will argue and show below.   
 
Silent technology is: Salient technology is: 
Embedded / hidden  On the ‘surface’ /conspicuous 
Passive operation  
(limited user involvement) 
Active operation  
(fair user involvement) 
Application flexibility  
(open ended) 
Application stability  
(firm) 
Obscure 
(form/operation/outcome) 
Transparent 
(form/operation/outcome) 
Mobile (soft -ware) Located (hard-ware) 
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How then can we scrutinise these software algorithms? The only recourse we have to evaluating 
these algorithms is to look at their performance under controlled conditions as was done in the 
Facial Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) of 2000 and 2002.  These evaluations will be the core 
of our analysis below. This is not entirely satisfactory as these tests are mostly focused on the 
evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the systems and not focused on the discovery of 
biases as such. In addition such tests are carried out through a highly interested and biased set of 
parties: a transatlantic but US-military and intelligence dominated collective led by the US 
Department of Defense (DoD). 
 
It is our argument that the silent nature of information technology makes it difficult for society to 
scrutinise it.  Furthermore, this inability to scrutinise creates unprecedented opportunities for this 
silent and ‘invisible’ micro politics to become pervasive (Graham and Wood, 2003). Thus, we 
tend to have extensive community consultation and impact studies when we build a new 
motorway.  However, we tend not to do this when we install CCTV in public places or when 
we install FRSs in public spaces such as airports, shopping malls, etc.  To put is simply: most 
informed people understand the cost (economic, personal, social, environmental) of a 
motorway, however they do not understand the cost of FRSs in ‘smart’ CCTV.  This paper is 
an attempt to make this cost more visible.  
 
 
3. The politics of Facial Recognition Systems 
 
Getting a digital face: the facial recognition system 
Figure 1 below depicts the typical way that a facial recognition system (FRS) system can be 
made operational. 
  
 
Figure 1:  Overview of FRS  
(Source: FRVT, 2002) 
 
The first step is the capturing of a face image. This would normally be done using a still or video 
camera. As such it can be incorporated into existing ‘passive’ CCTV systems. However, 
Introna and Wood: Picturing Algorithmic Surveillance 
Surveillance & Society 2(2/3) 
 
185 
locating a face image in the field of vision is not a trivial matter. The effectiveness of the whole 
system is dependent on the quality of the captured face image. The face image is passed to the 
recognition software for recognition (identification or verification). This would normally involve a 
number of steps such as normalising the face image and then creating a ‘template’ of ‘print’ to 
be compared to those in the database. If there is a ‘match’ then an alarm would solicit an 
operator’s attention to verify the match and initiate the appropriate action. The match can either 
be a true match which would lead to investigative action or it might be a ‘false positive’ which 
means the recognition algorithm made a mistake and the alarm would be cancelled.  Each 
element of the system can be located at different locations within a network, making it easy for a 
single operator to respond to a variety of systems.  
 
For our analysis we want to concentrate on steps two and three of the system. We want to 
scrutinise the FR algorithms, the image database (also called the gallery) and the operators. At 
each of these points important decisions are made which may have an important political 
implication.    
     
Facial Recognition Algorithms and R eduction 
Research in software algorithms for facial recognition has been ongoing for the last 30 years or 
so (Gross et al., 2001). However, advances in information technology and statistical methods 
have given impetus to this development with seemingly excellent recognition results and low 
error rates—at least in ideal laboratory conditions.  It is possible to identify two main  categories 
of algorithms according to Gross et al. (2001): 
 
· Image template algorithms. These algorithms use a template-based method to calculate the 
correlation between a face and one or more standard templates to estimate the face identity. 
These standard templates tend to capture the global features of a gallery of face images. 
Thus, the individual face identity is the difference between (or deviation from) the general or 
‘standard’ face.  This is an intuitive approach since we as humans tend to look for distinctive 
features (or differences from the general) when we identify individuals.  Some of the 
methods used are: Support Vector Machines (SVM), Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA), Neural Networks, Kernel Methods etc. The most commercially known template 
based algorithm is the MIT Bayesian Eigenface technique, which has been developed with 
the PCA method. During various tests conducted in 1996, its performance was consistently 
near the top compared to other available at the time.  
 
· Geometry feature-based algorithms. These methods capture the local facial features and 
their geometric relationships. They often locate anchor points at key facial features (eyes, 
nose, mouth, etc), connect these points to form a net and then measure the distances and 
angles of the net to create a unique face ‘print’.  The most often cited of these is the 
technique known as Local Feature Analysis (LFA), which is used in the Identix (formerly 
Visionics) face recognition system called FaceIt.  The LFA method, in contrast to the PCA 
technique, is less sensitive to variations in lighting, skin tone, eye glasses, facial expression, 
hair style, and individual’s pose up to 35 degrees.   
 
The commonality in both of these groups of techniques is the issue of reduction. In order to be 
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efficient in processing and storage the actual face image gets reduced to a numerical 
representation (as small as 84 bytes or 84 individual characters in the case of FaceIt). With this 
reduction certain information is disregarded (as incidental or irrelevant) at the expense of others. 
It is here that we need to focus our analysis.  What are the consequences of the process of 
reduction? It would be best to understand this through some detailed study of the logic and 
operation of these algorithms in diverse settings with diverse databases. This has not yet being 
done (not even in the FRVT 2002, which has been the most comprehensive thus far). 
Nevertheless, with our limited knowledge we can make some logical conclusions and then see 
how these may play out in the FRVT 2002 evaluations.  How will the reduction effect the 
performance of these algorithms? 
 
· Template based algorithms.  In these algorithms certain biases become built into the 
standard template. It obviously depends on the gallery used to create the standard template 
as well as the range of potential variations within a population. For example, because 
minorities tend to deviate the most from the standard template they might become easier to 
recognise.  
 
· Feature based algorithms .  These algorithms do not have an initial bias. However, because 
of the reduction the ‘face prints’ generated are in close proximity to each other. Thus, as the 
gallery database increases more and more face prints are generated in ever diminishing 
proximity, thereby making the discrimination required for the recognition task more difficult. 
Therefore the operation of the system deteriorates rapidly as the database increases (this is 
also true for template based algorithms). It also makes the system dependent on good 
quality face images. The implication of this is that the system will operate at its best with a 
small database and good quality face capture, such as an operator assisted face capture 
(reintroducing the operator bias). In addition to this it will tend to be better at identifying 
those that are more distinctive, or less similar, to those already in the database (such as 
minorities).       
 
Thus, in both cases we would expect some form of bias to emerge as a result of the reduction. 
Is this conclusion borne out by the performance of these algorithms in the FRVT?  Let us now 
consider the results of these evaluations. 
 
The Evaluations: Reduction, Operation and Error 
The most significant evaluation of FRSs happened with the Facial Recognition Vendor Tests of 
2002 (Philips et al., 2003). These test were independent tests sponsored by a host of 
organizations such as Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Department 
of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This evaluation followed in the footsteps of the 
earlier FRVT of 2000 and the FERET evaluations of 1994, 95 and 96.  In the FRVT 2002 ten 
FRS vendors participated in the evaluations. The FRVT of 2002 were more significant than any 
of the previous evaluations because of:  
 
· The use of a large database (37437 individuals) 
· The use of a medium size database of outdoor and video images 
· Some attention given to demographics 
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The large database (referred to as the HCInt data set) is a subset of a much larger database 
which was provided by the Visa Services Directorate, Bureau of Consular Affairs of the U.S. 
Department of State.  The HCInt data set consisted of 121,589 images of 37,437 individuals 
with at least three images of each person. All individuals were from the Mexican non-immigrant 
visa archive . The images were typical visa application type photographs with a universally 
uniform background, all gathered in a consistent manner. 
  
The medium size database consisted of a number outdoor and video images from various 
sources. Figure 2 below gives an indication of the images in the database. The top row contains 
images taken indoors and the bottom contains outdoor images taken on the same day. Notice 
the quality of the outdoor images. The face is consistently located in the frame and similar in 
orientation to the indoor images. 
 
 
Figure 2: Indoor and outdoor images from the medium data base.  
(Source: FRVT, 2002) 
 
For the identification task an image of an unknown person is provided to a system (assumed to 
be in the database). The system then compares the unknown image (called the probe image) to 
the database of known people. The results of this comparison are then presented by the system, 
to an operator, in a ranked listing of the top n ‘candidates’ (referred to as the ‘rank’, typically 
anywhere from 1 to 50). If the correct image is somewhere in the top n, then the system is 
considered to have performed the identification task correctly. Figure 3 below indicates the 
performance at rank 1, 10 and 50 for the three top performers in the evaluation.  
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Figure 3: Performance at rank 1, 10 and 50 for the three top performers in the evaluation  
(from FRVT 2002, Overview and Summary, p.9.) 
 
With the very good images from the large database (37,437 images) the identification 
performance of the best system at rank one is 73% at a false accept rate of 1%.  There is a 
tradeoff between the recognition rates and the level of ‘false accepts’ (incorrect identification) 
one is prepared to accept, the false accept rate.  If you are prepared to accept a higher false 
accept rate then the recognition performance can go up. However, this will give you more cases 
of false identification to deal with. This rate is normally a threshold parameter that can be set by 
the operators of the system.   
 
What are the factors that that can detract from this ‘ideal’ performance? There might be many. 
The FRVT 2002 considered three: 
 
· Indoor versus outdoor images 
· The time delay between the database image and the probe image 
· The size of the database 
 
The identification performance drops dramatically when outdoor images are used—in spite of 
the fact that they can be judge as relatively good—as indicated above. One would not expect a 
typical video camera to get this quality of image all the time.  For the best systems the 
recognition rate for faces captured outdoors (i.e. less than ideal circumstances) was only 50% at 
a false accept rate of 1%.  Thus, as the report concluded: “face recognition from outdoor 
imagery remains a research challenge area.”  The main reason for this problem is that the 
algorithm cannot distinguish between the change in tone, at the pixel level, caused by a relatively 
dark shadow, versus such a change caused by a facial feature. As such it starts to code 
shadows as facial features. The impact of this on the identification may be severe if it happens to 
be in certain key areas of the face.    
  
As one would expect, the identification performance also decreases as time laps increases 
between the acquisition of the database image and the newly captured probe image presented to 
a system. FRVT 2002 found that for the top systems, performance degraded at approximately 
5% points per year.  It is not unusual of the security establishment to have a relatively old 
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photograph of a suspect.  Thus, a two year old photograph will take 10% off the identification 
performance. A study by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology found that two 
sets of mugshots taken 18 months apart produced a recognition rate of only 57% (Brooks, 
2002).  Gross et al (2001: 17) found an even more dramatic deterioration. In their evaluation 
the performance dropped by 20% in recognition rate for images just two weeks apart. 
Obviously these evaluations are not directly comparable. Nevertheless, there is a clear indication 
that there may be a significant deterioration when there is a time gap between the database 
image and the probe image.   
 
What about the size of the database?  For the best system, “the top-rank identification rate was 
85% on a database of 800 people, 83% on a database of 1,600, and 73% on a database of 
37,437.  For every doubling of database size, performance decreases by two to three overall 
percentage points” (Philips et al., 2003: 21).  What would this mean for extremely large 
databases? For example the UK fingerprint database consists of approximately 5.5 million 
records. If one had a similar size ‘mugshot’ database how will the algorithms perform in 
identifying a probe image in that database? If one takes the decrease to be 2.5% for every 
doubling of the database, and use 73% at 37,437 as the baseline, then one would expect the 
identification performance to be approximately 55% in ideal conditions and as low as 32% in 
less than ideal conditions. 
 
To conclude this discussion we can imagine a very plausible scenario where we have a large 
database, less than ideal image due to factors such as variable illumination, outdoor conditions, 
poor camera angle, etc, and the probe image is relatively old, a year or two.  Under these 
conditions the probability to be recognized is very low, unless one sets the false accept rate to a 
much higher level, which means than there is a risk that a high number of individual may be 
subjected to scrutiny for the sake of a few potential identifications. What will be the implications 
of this for practice? We will take up this point again below.  Obviously we do know how these 
factors would act together and they are not necessarily cumulative. Nevertheless it seems 
reasonable to believe that there will be some interaction that would lead to some cumulative 
affect.   
 
Such a conclusion can make sense of the Tampa Police Department case reported by ACLU 
(Stanley and Steinhardt, 2002) as well as the Palm Beach International Airport also reported by 
the ACLU. In the Tampa case the system was abandoned because of all the false positive 
alarms it generated. As far as it could be ascertained it did not make one single positive 
identification. In the Palm Beach Airport case the system achieved a mere 47% correct 
identifications of a group of 15 volunteers using a database of 250 images (Brooks, 2002).  In 
Newham, UK, the police admitted that the FaceIt system had not made a single positive 
identification, in spite of working with a small database. One could argue that there might not 
have been the potential for a match to be made as none of the individual in the database actually 
appeared in the street. Nevertheless, the system could not ‘spot’ a Guardian journalist, placed 
in the database, that intentionally presented himself in the two zones covered by the system 
(Meek, 2002). These cases indicate the complexity of real world scenarios. We now want to 
move to the focal concern of this paper namely the question of biases in the algorithms 
themselves. 
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Reduction and Biased Code  
The most surprising outcome – for those involved – of the FRVT 2002 is the realization that the 
algorithms displayed particular identification biases. First, recognition rates for males were higher 
than females. For the top systems, identification rates for males were 6% to 9% points higher 
than that of females. For the best system, identification performance on males was 78% and for 
females was 79%.  Second, recognition rates for older people were higher than younger people. 
For 18 to 22 year olds the average identification rate for the top systems was 62%, and for 38 
to 42 year olds was 74%. For every ten years increase in age, on average performance 
increases approximately 5% through age 63. Unfortunately they could not check race as the 
large data set consisted of mostly Mexican non-immigrant visa applicants.  However, research 
by Givens et al. (2003), using PCA algorithms, has confirmed the biases in the FRVT 2002 
(except for the gender bias) and also found a significant race bias. This was confirmed using 
balanced databases and controlling for other factors. They concluded that:  “Asians are easier 
[to recognize] than whites, African-Americans are easier than whites, other race members are 
easier than whites, old people are easier than young people, other skin people are easier to 
recognize than clear skin people…”  (8). Their results are indicated in Figure 4 below.  
 
 
Figure 4:  Factors making it harder or easier to correctly identify a probe image presented 
to a system  
(Source: Givens et al., 2003) 
 
These results were also found in another context by Furl, Phillips and O’Toole (2002) in their 
study of recognition performance by thirteen different algorithms. One can legitimacy ask 
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whether these differences, probably in the order of 5-10%, really makes a difference? Are they 
not rather trivial? We would argue that taken by themselves they may seem rather trivial. 
However, as we argued earlier on, it is when these trivial differences become incorporated into 
a network of practices that the may become extremely important. This is what we now want to 
explore: the politics of the digital face as it becomes imbedded in practices.   
  
 
4. The politics of the digital face 
 
FRS’s: Efficient, Effective and Neutral 
Many security analysts see FRSs as the ideal biometric to deal with the new emerging security 
environment.  They claim that it is efficient (FaceIt only requires a single 733 Mhz Pentium PC 
to run) and effective, often quoting close to 80% recognition rates from the FRVT 2002 
evaluation while leaving out of the discussion issues of the quality of the images used in the 
FRVT, size of the database, the elapsed time between database image and probe image, etc.  
But most of all they claim that these systems “performs equally well on all races and both 
genders. Does not matter if population is homogeneous or heterogeneous in facial appearance” 
(Faceit technical specification7). This claim is not only made by the suppliers of FRSs such as 
Identix and Imagis Technologies. It is also echoed in various security forums: “Face recognition 
is completely oblivious to differences in appearance as a result of race or gender differences and 
is a highly robust Biometrics”8  Even the critical scholar Gary Marx (1995: 238) argued that 
algorithmic surveillance provides the possibility of eliminating discrimination. The question is not 
whether these claims are correct or not. One could argue that in a certain sense they are correct. 
The significance of these claims is the way they frame the technology. It presents the technology 
itself as neutral and unproblematic. More than this it presents the technology as a solution to the 
problem of terrorism. Atick of Identix claimed, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, that with FaceIt 
the US has the “ability to turn all of these cameras around the country into a national shield” 
(O'Harrow, 2001).  He might argue that in the face of terrorism ‘minor’ injustices (biases in the 
algorithms) and loss of privacy is a small price to pay for security. This may be so, although we 
would disagree.  
 
Nevertheless, our main concern is that these arguments present the technical artifacts in isolation 
with disregard to the socio-technical networks within which they will become imbedded. As 
argued above, it is not just the micro-politics of the artifact that is the issue. It is how these 
become multiplied and magnified as they become tied to other practices that is of significance. 
We need to understand the ‘network effects’, as it were, of the micro-politics of artifacts. This is 
especially so for silent digital technology. There is every reason to believe that the silent and 
non-invasiveness of FRSs make it highly desirable as a biometric for digital surveillance. It is 
therefore important that this technology becomes scrutinized for its potential in the socio -
technical network of digital surveillance. Thus, not just as isolated objects as was done in the 
FRVTs but in its multiplicity of implementations and practices. We would claim it is here where 
                                                
7 http://www.identix.com/newsroom/news_biometrics_face_acc.html 
8 http://www.ats -computers.com/biometrics/face.html 
http://www.biocom.tv/BIOMETRICS_types.htm 
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the seemingly trivial biases may become very important as they become incorporated into actual 
practices. 
 
FRS’s in Practice: Alarms, Biases and Suspects 
There is an urgent need for an in-depth study of FRSs in practice (as has been done with CCTV 
by Norris and Armstrong (1999) and others). However, since we currently only have a limited 
number of systems in operation and due to the sensitivity of these implementations it is unlikely 
that we would be able do so in the near future. Thus, in the face of this limitation, we propose to 
outline what we consider to be a highly probable scenario of how these digital biases may 
become incorporated into other practices that would render these seemingly trivial biases 
significant. 
 
Based on the FRVT of 2002 we know that, although FRSs have the capability to achieve a 70-
85% accuracy rate, this is only in ideal circumstances. The system’s performance degrades 
significantly in an uncontrolled ‘face-in-the-crowd’ environment, with a large database, and 
where there is an elapsed time between the database image and the probe image.  This would 
seem to us to be a usual rather than an unusual situation. What will happen if the system’s 
performance degrades under these rather usual conditions?  
 
We would propose that two possibilities are most likely. First, it is possible that the operators 
will become so used to false positives that they will start to treat all alarms as false positives 
thereby rendering the system useless. Alternatively, they may deal with it by increasing the 
identification threshold (requesting the system to reduce the number of false positives). This will 
obviously also increase the false negatives, thereby raising all sorts of questions about the value 
of the system into question. However, more important to us, with an increased threshold small 
differences in identifiability (the biases outlined above) will mean that those that are easier to 
identify by the algorithms (African-Americans, Asians, dark skinned persons and older people) 
will have a greater probability of triggering the alarm.  If the alarm is an actual positive 
recognition then one could argue that nothing is lost.  However, it also means that these groups 
would be subjected to a higher probability of scrutiny as false positives, i.e. mistaken identity.  
Moreover we would propose that this scrutiny will be more intense as it would be based on the 
assumption that the system is working at a higher level and therefore would be more accurate.  
In such a case existing biases, against the usual suspects (such as minorities), will tend to come 
into play (Norris and Armstrong, 1999). The operators may even override their own 
judgements as they may think that the system under such high conditions of operation must ‘see 
something’ that they do not. This is highly likely as humans are not generally very good a facial 
recognition in pressurised situations as was indicated in a study by Kemp et al. (1997). Thus, 
under these conditions the bias group (African-Americans, Asians, dark skinned persons and 
older people) may be subjected to disproportionate scrutiny, thereby creating a new type of 
‘digital divide’ (Jupp in Graham and Wood, 2003: 234).   
 
How likely is this scenario? We believe it to be more likely than we presume. We have only the 
following anecdotal evidence reported in the Discover Magazine of an installation at the Fresno 
Yosemite International Airport to suggest:  
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“[The system] generates about one false positive for every 750 passengers 
scanned, says Pelco vice president Ron Cadle. Shortly after the system  was 
installed, a man who looked as if he might be from the Middle East set the 
system off. “The gentleman was detained by the FBI, and he ended  up spending 
the night,” says Cadle. “We put him up in a hotel, and he caught his flight the 
next day.”   
(Garpinkle, 2002: 19 – emphasis added) 
 
To produce only one false positive per 700 passengers the system had to operate with a  very 
restricted false positive rate, thereby suggesting that an alarm must ‘mean something’. Notice 
that one of the false positives was a man supposedly from ‘Middle Eastern’ origin. The 
individual was detained and questioned by the FBI because “looked as if he might be from the 
Middle East”  in spite of the fact that he was obviously a false positive. There could be many 
explanations for this action. Nevertheless, it is likely that they may have decided to detain him 
‘just in case’ the system saw something they did not see. This case clearly demonstrates the 
scenario we outline above.  Our analysis has demonstrated that seemingly trivial differences in 
recognition rates, within the algorithm, can indeed have important political implications for some 
when it becomes incorporated into a whole set of socio-technical surveillance practices.  
 
One might imagine that in an environment where there is an acute sense of vulnerability it would 
not be unreasonable to store these false positives in a database ‘just in case’. These false 
positive may then become targets for further scrutiny. Why? Just because they have features that 
make them more distinctive. We are not saying that this will happen. We are merely trying to 
indicate how seemingly trivial ‘technical issues’ can add up to political ideologies at the expense 
of some for the sake of others. This is the issue of the politics of FRSs. This is particularly 
dangerous politics in the case of silent technologies such as FRSs.    
 
Other areas remain problematic.In a legal-technical review of the technology based largely on a 
previous FRVT, Michael Bromby (2002) claims that facial recognition offers a significant 
improvement over human identification, which can be extremely limited. However he is also 
careful to argue that because of shortcomings, it can only be considered as supplementary to 
other human and technological forms of recognition. In fact the flaws in Facial Recognition are 
similar to those of human identification: the problems of environmental conditions, angle of view, 
the gradual decrease in ability to recognise as the number of individual faces to choose from 
increases, the inability to deal with aging faces, and so on. Psychological research has shown 
that human beings can only definitively recognise a limited number of people, and whilst this has 
sometimes been attributed to evolutionary factors in human neural development, Facial 
Recognition’s troubles with larger numbers may indicate that human facial types are simply more 
limited in their basic variety than we often assume. The problem is that the simplest technical 
solution – increasing the number of variables – leads to increasing complexity (and therefore 
more problems) and also potentially makes the systems prey to less fundamental changes in 
faces: hair, colour etc.  
 
More complex solutions, for example, the use of predictive algorithms (as for example in the 
Cromatica system operating on the London Underground) and neural networks (connectionism) 
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to allow heuristics (learning) in recognition systems, or ‘best guess’ and fuzzy logic systems, take 
the system further away from the (at least relative) certainty about identity demanded by the 
state and other users and more towards simulation or reconstruction. Surveillance of course has 
always had a strong connection to simulation (see: Bogard, 1996; Graham, 1998), but it seems 
that with heuristic systems and even with simpler technologies analysed by FRVT 2002 like 
normalisaton and three-dimensional morphing (where several images are converted into a virtual 
model of the head), we are moving further along the spectrum towards outright simulation which 
raises questions as to what exactly software-driven surveillance systems are ‘seeing’. The 
complex modeling technologies also make the problem of enrolment – the difficulties of 
obtaining the necessary images for the database – still more problematic. 
 
A vital point is that the human actants involved in facial recognition collectives need to be aware 
of these limitations. And it is not always evident that they are. A paper by Clive Reedman, 
former Director of the UK’s Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) posted onto 
the Biometrics discussion list, refers to “the success of a CCTV/Facial Recognition 
implementation in London’s East End” (Reedman 2002: 7), when we have seen that success is 
hardly how the implementation of the FaceIT system in Newham can be characterised.  Indeed 
the same paper lists quite clearly the theoretical attractions of facial recognition to law 
enforcement:  
 
manually attempting to find a ‘face in the crowd’, or identify a suspect from 
pictures of known offenders is a notoriously difficult task, as well as a very 
costly one in terms of police time. Just watch a single video monitor in a local 
council’s control room for hours on end waiting for a particular individual to 
appear for a second or two and you will soon realise the concept of ‘face 
blindness’. See the success of a television programme such as the BBC’s 
Crimewatch, which relies heavily on the fact that images can be shared amongst 
a national audience and you will soon grasp that the chances of identifying an 
individual increase dramatically the wider that audience is. (Reedman, 2002: 6) 
 
However if there is any ‘law’ in the history of technology it is that technologies are rarely used in 
ways that their inventors intended. Mitch Gray (2003) in a recent piece asks ‘Will we recognise 
the facial recognition society?’ This is the right question with the wrong focus. There will not be 
a facial recognition society, only partly because societies are never entirely defined by particular 
technologies even in the era of ASTEs, but mainly because the limits of facial recognition may 
mean that it will only ever be of limited use on its own. The use of facial recognition in the way in 
which Reedman describes it above is far from the techno-optimistic PR of Biometrics 
companies, rather is seen more mundanely as an efficient labour-saving device. The Tampa 
experience suggests however that notions of efficiency are also questionable. Gray concentrates 
on the development of micro-expression recognition technologies, but given the problems of 
facial recognition at much more basic stages, it seems that this is some distance away.  
 
None of this means that progress will slow the development and improvement of FRS’s. There 
is no doubt in our minds that facial biometrics will remain a very important part of the future 
security infrastructure. Kopel and Krause (2003) report that: “As of June 2001 the Departments 
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of Justice and Defence had given about $21.3 million and $24.7 million, respectively, to the 
research and development of FRSs.” Its perceived efficiency, ease of implementation and 
invisible nature make FRS the ideal biometric technology for the foreseeable future.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
This paper has shown simply that at present FRS’s do not work in the way that is claimed by 
their manufacturers, and that their use is at present highly limited in conjunction with open-street 
CCTV. However the current enthusiasm for FRS’s means that FRS’s require careful scrutiny 
and regulation. We can not remain naïve about such a powerful technology. On the other hand, 
facial recognition can also be seen as merely a temporarily fashionable biometric amongst many 
other surveillance technologies currently being advanced, and it is not the success or failure of 
particular technologies that is driving the development of surveillance, but a move towards 
integration of multiple technologies and new ways of managing information flow from these 
multiple technologies.  
 
This has important implications for theorising CCTV in that it emphasises that surveillance at 
root is founded on sorting and categorisation not on vision (see Lyon 2004). Theorising visibility 
or vision cannot therefore provide in itself a general understanding of ‘surveillance’. Further it 
emphasises the necessity of a socio-technical approach which is able to integrate technological 
development into a more general understanding of what ‘society’ means, rather than seeing it as 
something external to core social variables.  
 
An important part of our democratic society is our supposed equality before the law. 
Unfortunately, as many studies of police practices have shown, this is not always the case 
(Marx, 1988). These studies show that humans carry their biases into their workplace. That it is 
not possible to simply exclude these prejudices from your workplace behaviour if they are 
already part of your social make-up. Nevertheless, we are mostly aware of this. As such, one 
can always legitimately appeal for further consideration and scrutiny. Indeed we have developed 
a variety of mechanisms and procedures to scrutinise the behaviour of law enforcement officers. 
However, when it comes to technology we mostly assume it to be neutral and value free. Thus, 
we tend not to subject artefacts to the same level of scrutiny.  
 
It is our view that this social and technical distinction with respect to technology is inappropriate 
for two reasons: (a) technical artefact already embody values in its design, it is ‘society made 
durable’ as suggested by Latour, and (b) technical artefact never act in isolation but become 
imbedded into a socio-technical network in which the micro-politics of the artefact can become 
multiplied and sized upon in many unexpected ways (Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000).  We 
believe we have given an illustration of this as exemplified in FRS.  What would the policy 
implication of such an analysis be. There are many. We will highlight the following: 
 
· A need for more detailed studies of FR algorithms with a particular emphasis on biases. We 
need to understand why these biases emerge and what we ought to do to eliminate or limit 
them. 
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· A need for more detailed studies of actual implementations of FRSs. What are the 
appropriate ways to imbed this technology into a larger security infrastructure 
· The development of an appropriate legal framework to prevent the misuse of the technology 
(especially as private installations increase). There is no doubt that this technology will also 
contribute to ‘surveillance creep’ as argued by Marx (1988: 2).  
· A very strong legal framework that prohibit or control the circulation of individuals facial 
biometric (‘face prints’) without due process. 
 
Obviously more in-depth study of actual installations of FRS’s and a continuous and careful 
watch on technological development in the biometrics industry and its political economy are 
required. Nevertheless, we believe we have demonstrated that there are many aspects of this 
silent technology that still needs to be scrutinised. It is not feasible to remain naïve to the politics 
of such a powerful technology. 
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